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Abstract
This research experiment investigated whether the nuclear taboo was more influential on
participants when considering the use of nuclear weapons, or if the participants were influenced
more by cost benefit analysis when deciding to use nuclear weapons. In this study, we presented
a fake military scenario to respondents with a total of eight different versions that either did or
did not include: genocide, high casualties, and nuclear weapons. Participants could then select
whether they agreed, disagreed, or needed more information as there answer. Breaking
respondents down into these three groups, the results show that for all three respondent groups
the independent variable with the strongest effect was nuclear weapons. The weakest variable
was high casualty rates, while genocide had the second strongest effect on the respondent’s
decision-making process. These findings indicate that respondents were affected by the nuclear
taboo and were less likely to conduct cost-benefit analysis when giving their answer to the
military proposal.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most powerful devices ever created by mankind are nuclear weapons. Used
only once in combat, they have not been used since World War Two. Many have tried to explain
the precedent of non-use, and one school of thought is the nuclear taboo. The purpose of this
thesis is to determine if social norms shape public attitudes regarding the use of nuclear weapons
based on Nuclear Taboo Theory. A norm is defined by Tannenwald (1999) as, “a shared
expectation about behavior, a standard of right or wrong.” (pg. 436). This mutual expectation
exists between sovereign states who are also members of the international community.
According to Tannenwald, the nuclear taboo forbids the use of nuclear weapons, and focuses not
on the behavior itself, but the belief about the behavior (1999, 436). Each state’s influence over
their populations helps establish such normative beliefs among each state’s citizens creating a
consensus internationally about the behavior.
However, Press, Sagan, and Valentino found that the nuclear taboo is weak among
Americans, and that it does not take much for Americans to approve of the use of nuclear
weapons (2013, 202). These findings seriously undercut the claims of Tannenwald and others
that a nuclear taboo is effective in preventing the use of nuclear weapons. According to Press,
Sagan, and Valentino, only a small group of subjects who rejected the use of nuclear weapons
based their response about using nuclear weapons as immoral (2013, 202). These findings
indicate the nuclear taboo is weak, and that there might be other explanations for why nuclear
weapons have not been used during conflicts. However, there are problems with Press, Sagan,
and Valentino’s (2013) research design. This thesis will use a more appropriate experimental
framework to test if the nuclear taboo shapes public opinion on the use of nuclear weapons.
1

LITERATURE REVIEW
Previous literature regarding the nuclear taboo argues that the public sees the use of
nuclear weapons as morally wrong. The nuclear taboo is a concept that is derived from an
international relations theory known as constructivism. According to Checkel, constructivism has
two assumptions, first the environment where states interact takes place is social and material,
second this setting offers states an understanding of their interests by constituting to them (1998,
325). These two assumptions allow for the environment of the international system to dictate
actions and assumptions that states make towards others, which provide states with an identity
that tells others what their interests are. These interests provide the foundation for social norms
to be created that cause states to behave a certain way or share similar beliefs, such as the nuclear
taboo. Yu-tai Tsai (2009) states, “Constructivism emphasizes the sociological concepts of ideas,
norms, identity and culture.” (22). These social concepts help create and change the way states
interact in the international system.
According to Tannenwald, the United States in from using nuclear weapons during the
Korean War, because their allies viewed nuclear weapons as immoral (1999, 445). This response
from other states in the international system gave a consensus that nuclear weapons were indeed
not appropriate to use. Tannenwald (2007) stated, “A powerful taboo against the use of nuclear
weapons has developed in the global system” (2). This indicates that this belief is a part of the
international social order and is binding to all member. Also, Tannenwald says the taboo helps
define weapons into categories such as acceptable or unacceptable and has become a set of
practices among states defining what it means to be civilized (1999, 437). This allows for nuclear
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weapons to be labeled by states with a clear rule as to what actions have limits to them and that
these limits are established through normative beliefs about the use of nuclear weapons.
According to Tannenwald, a taboo is a normative prohibition that is focused on
protecting individuals and societies from conducting behavior that could be harmful to others
and themselves (2005, 8). The nuclear taboo represents an intervention among states in the
international system that all states must avoid this type of behavior due to the risks associated
with nuclear weapons, which could have apocalyptic ramifications. Quester says, a taboo is
something that we simply reject, and are not willing even consider doing (2005, 79). It is this
outcome that forces states to not only comply with the taboo but see it as a necessary action to
prevent any state from breaking the taboo. Additionally, Tannenwald claims evidence of a
nuclear taboo can be seen by the way people think and talk about nuclear weapons, and actions
taken by leaders of states as well as international organizations (2005, 9). The nuclear taboo does
exist because state actors associate a certain type of destruction with the use of nuclear weapons
that is severe. This interpretation is proof that a taboo has developed when it comes to the use of
nuclear weapons and how nuclear missiles differ from conventional types of weapons.
According to Paul proof of the existence of a nuclear taboo can be seen by the fact that
there exists no legal ban on the use of nuclear weapons, and nuclear states have refrained from
using them against nonnuclear states, even when it made sense to use them (1995, 699). This
proves that states, who are sovereign members of the international system do see the use of
nuclear weapons as wrong and will not consent to using nuclear weapons even if it increases
their odds of winning a war. Also, this demonstrates that even though the use of nuclear weapons
may be beneficial to a state in the short term, it would have long term effects that would cause
3

damage to the international system. This damage would destroy all the states in the system,
including any state who used nuclear weapons. The outcome of non-use by nuclear states, is a
result of the nuclear taboo, and the taboo’s perception about nuclear weapons forces states to
avoid being associated with nuclear usage.
Also, Paul stated that, the nuclear taboo developed due to the amount of destruction
associated with nuclear weapons, giving them a unique distinction from other types of weapons
(1995, 702). The destruction that is so closely related to the use nuclear weapons would provide
another reason why states would not want to use nuclear weapons. It will allow for massive
amounts of devastation in such a short period of time, which states would mostly likely never be
able to recover if nuclear weapons were used regularly in combat. Due to the type of destruction
caused by nuclear weapons, it would cost states a lot of money and time to rebuild parts of their
country, especially if a large portion of their population was killed. These consequences would
make many states want to avoid massive loss of their population or infrastructure because the
effects would be immediate, rather than expanding gradually.
Gizewski claims that, the nuclear taboo is a significant obstacle causing restraint to the
use of nuclear weapons (1996, 398). This shows that the taboo has law type of effect that forces
states to view the use of nuclear weapons an illegal action. According to Paul (2010), “A taboo
has an absoluteness to it whereby individual leaders would not consider the use of nuclear
weapons as a rational option under any circumstances” (854). This establishes that the nuclear
taboo has a significant effect on individual leaders, causing them to see the taboo as type of norm
that should be preserved. Frey stated, norms are the rules about behavior, based upon an identity
(2006, 5). Those who follow the taboo share a common identity that sees the use of nuclear
4

weapons as mutual destructive. It is this commonality that helps fuel the nuclear taboo and has
provided the results of non-use for the past 70 years.
In Press, Sagan, and Valentino’s experiment they discuss two distinct concepts that help
describe the logic of actions, they are logic of consequence and logic of appropriateness.
According to Schulz, logic of consequence and logic of appropriateness are helpful in classifying
the actions of imperfectly rational actors and can be beneficial in understanding their behavior.
(2014, 2). These two logics were used to examine survey respondents in Press, Sagan, and
Valentino’s research experiment to see if people would approve of the use of nuclear weapons.
Schultz (2014) states that, “Actors driven by logic of consequence engage in some form of
imperfect analysis to evaluate future consequences of their decisions” (2). The weighing of
possible outcomes to situations helps actors assess what actions are the best or cost effective.
Kopelman, Messick, and Weber finds that appropriateness is distinct because of its emphasis on
rules as driving decision making processes. (2004, 283).
According to March and Olsen (2011), “The logic of appropriateness is a perspective on
how human action is to be interpreted.” (pg. 478). March and Olsen define the logic of
appropriateness as human actions that are driven by rules about certain behavior, that actors seek
to fulfill these obligations embedded through social collectivity (2011, 478). The nuclear taboo is
seen as the responsible interpretation to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by all members in
the international community because the taboo is directed by the interests of each state’s
institutions. Kopelman, Messick, and Weber (2004) state, “Rules simplify behavioral choices by
narrowing options” (283). States with nuclear weapons know that if they use them, they will be
violating their own institutions norms. These repercussions help keep states from not only using
5

nuclear weapons but limit the appeal to acquire them because they are unusable. Additionally,
March and Olsen describe the process of rule following as, a cognitive process that involves
reasoning; but is not connected to future consequences, rather acting appropriately according to
collective practices, based on mutual understandings of what is true, reasonable, right, and good.
(2011, 479.)
However, some recent research on the topic of the nuclear taboo puts the assumption that
the public sees the use of nuclear weapons as morally wrong in doubt. According to Press,
Sagan, and Valentino, public opinion surveys have been used to try and measure the public
perception regarding nuclear weapons; however, these surveys are often yes or no questions, and
do not look at the reasons behind their response (2013, 194). These surveys fail to capture why
nuclear weapons are perceived to be right or wrong due to the lack of an explanation for the
public’s negative response towards the use of nuclear weapons. Press, Sagan, and Valentino also
stated that public opinion polls about nuclear weapons are infrequently and inconsistently
worded. (2013, 194). Thus, they question many studies that suggest a nuclear taboo is the reason
why nuclear weapons have not been used.
According to Press, Sagan, and Valentino, scholars that studied nuclear norms focused on
the beliefs and attitudes of political and military leaders who made statements during past
military crisis involving the decision to use or not use nuclear weapons. (2013, 193). Focusing on
these elite’s statements helped give context to why leaders decided not to use nuclear weapons
and established the existence of a taboo among elites. However, Press, Sagan, and Valentino
argue that studying elite statements has limitations such as actions or views expressed could have
more than one explanation, as well many statements made have been in the public, which could
6

have a self-serving bias, and limits the study of nuclear attitudes to historical cases only. (2013,
193). These critics put assumptions about the existence of a nuclear taboo in doubt and forces the
need for more analysis and research to be conducted on the topic, to determine how strong the
taboo is on the public’s perception on the use of nuclear weapons.
The results of Press, Sagan, and Valentino’s experiment show that social norms are not
the reason why the public is against the use of nuclear weapons, rather that the costs outweigh
the benefits of using them (2013, 202). This argument is derived from the logic of consequence,
which Schultz defines as actions that are driven by an individual’s assessment of all the possible
outcomes and choosing the one that is seen as most beneficial (2014, 1). This argument
challenges the nuclear taboo by arguing that the public would consider the use of nuclear
weapons if the benefits outweighed the cost. Thus, the public perception about the use of nuclear
weapons is not inherently based in the idea that nuclear weapons are unjustifiable, but the public
can in fact justify their use depending upon desperation. As Press, Sagan, and Valentino (2013)
stated, “People do not dabble in cannibalism when they are a little hungry; rather they resist until
they are on the verge of starvation, and then only might they break the taboo.” (202). This
experiment has challenged the idea that cost benefit analysis trumps the nuclear taboo in
determining the public’s perception on nuclear weapons usage.
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
In this experiment, there are three independent variables that are being measured to assess
whether respondents are choosing their answer based off logic of consequence or logic of
appropriateness. Respondents will be given three options to choose for their answer, they can
choose to agree, disagree, or need more information. The first variable is the type of airstrike that
is being carried out (nuclear or conventional), the second is the number of casualties caused by
the airstrike (ranging from 5,000 to 50,000), and the third is presence of another social norm
(genocide). Each independent variable will be given a hypothesis, and there will be an additional
three hypotheses for respondents who selected need more information as their answer.
The independent variable high casualty rate will cause respondents to conduct cost
benefit analysis because the respondents will want to minimize the amount of lives lost in the
planned military operation. Additionally, if casualty rates are high, this will cause respondents to
be less supportive because they view the amount lives lost as costly. Also, if the operation results
in high casualty rates, respondents would view the military action as unnecessary, preferring to
seek an alternative military operation that would result in fewer casualties and would be more
likely to disagree with the planned military action. Respondents could also see high casualty
rates as potentially risky, considering that the military operation may kill a lot of innocent
people. Support for this hypothesis would falsify the nuclear taboo because respondents are
making their decision based off the expected casualty outcomes of the planned military action,
not the type of weapons being used.
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Hypothesis 1: Scenarios with higher casualty rates, will make respondents more likely to
disagree with the planned military action.
The independent variable low casualty rates will cause respondents to conduct cost
benefit analysis because the respondents will prefer to conduct military operations that have low
casualty outcomes. Seeing the outcomes of the military operation as more important, rather than
adhering to certain rules about military tactics. If casualties are low, the military operation will
appear more reasonable to the respondent because the number of casualties is low and do not
carry a heavy cost. With lower casualty rates respondents would agree with the planned military
action because there is a lesser possibility of innocent people dying because of the planned
military action. Support for this hypothesis would falsify the nuclear taboo because respondents
are making their decision based off the expected casualty outcomes of the planned military
action, not the type of weapons being used.
Hypothesis 2: Scenarios with lower casualty rates, will make respondents more likely to agree
with the planned military action.
The independent variable conventional airstrike will cause respondents to use logic of
appropriateness to come up with their answer because conventional weapons are seen as an
ethical military tactical response. Respondents will see the use of conventional weapons as a
normal practice of military strategy and will view the action as ordinary or routine. This will
cause the respondents to agree with the planned military action regardless of casualties because
the military action being taken is considered a routine type of operation. Also, respondents may
view casualties as a unpreventable outcome of military conflict. Additionally, respondents will
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view the use of conventional weapons as a responsible reaction and does not violate any rules.
Conventional airstrikes also could appear to be more effective because they minimize the amount
of U.S involvement in foreign conflicts. Support for the hypothesis would confirm that a nuclear
taboo is supported because the type of weapons being used is influencing the respondents
answer.
Hypothesis 3: Scenarios with conventional airstrikes present, will make respondents more
likely to agree with the planned military action.
The independent variable nuclear airstrike will cause respondents to use logic of
appropriateness to reach their answer because nuclear weapons are an unethical military tactic.
Respondents will view the use of nuclear weapons as an extreme type of evil in terms of military
capabilities. Respondents will not support the use of nuclear weapons because they see them as
morally wrong to use in military operations, because they cause massive amounts of casualties
and damage in a matter of seconds. Additionally, respondents would see using nuclear weapons
as a potential opportunity for U.S adversaries to retaliate or could signal to other states that
nuclear weapons are okay to use. As well respondents would see the use of nuclear weapons as
potentially damaging to U.S reputation. Also, respondents would consider the use of nuclear
weapons as an uncivilized type of military action, that is goes against American values. Support
for the hypothesis would confirm that a nuclear taboo is supported because the type of weapons
being used is influencing the respondents answer.
Hypothesis 4: Scenarios with nuclear airstrikes present, will make respondents more likely to
disagree with the planned military action.
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The independent variable genocide will cause respondents to use logic of appropriateness
to reach their answer because genocide is seen as repulsive action that is condemned by the
international community. Respondent’s will view the presence of genocide as an evil act that
must be stopped, and that all tactics are on the table when considering the prevention genocide.
Genocide will have the strongest effect on the respondents because of the historical implications
that this type of behavior has had in the past. Causing many respondents to view the act of
genocide as worse than the use of nuclear weapons or conducting a military operation that results
in high casualties. Although respondents may not want to use nuclear weapons or accept high
casualties, they will if that means preventing a genocide. Support for the hypothesis would
falsify the nuclear taboo because genocide is seen as a greater evil and must be prevented by any
means necessary.
Hypothesis 5: Scenarios with genocide present, will make respondents more likely to agree with
the planned military action.
The independent variable without genocide will cause respondents to use logic of
consequence to get their answer because without genocide in the scenario respondents will view
the military action as unnecessary. Genocide tends to cause a certain type of response that is
urgent and demands immediate action to prevent further atrocities. However, if this element is
absent in the scenario, fewer respondents will care because they will not see the military action
as in U.S interests. If there is no humanitarian need to step in, then fewer respondents will be
willing to use military resources because they view military action as to costly. Support for this
hypothesis does not confirm or falsify the nuclear taboo, because it does not measure whether the
use of nuclear weapons is affecting the respondents decision-making process.
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Hypothesis 6: Scenarios without genocide present, will make respondents more likely to
disagree with the planned military action.
Respondents were given a third option that they could select for their answer and that was
need more information. The reason respondents were given this option was to allow the
respondent to not have to commit to a yes or no answer. Also, this allowed for respondents to be
broken up into more than just two groups, providing a wider range of responses that could
include both logics. As well this answer was used to assess whether respondents would want to
look for more information or if they had enough to decide. Additionally, the need more
information option provided another test group to look at to examine which effects were the
strongest for each group of respondents.
The independent variable high casualty rate will cause respondents to conduct cost
benefit analysis because the respondents will want to minimize the amount of lives lost in the
planned military operation. Respondents will be less likely to select need more information if
casualty rates are high because the outcome is too costly. Additionally, respondents could also
see high casualty rates as potentially risky, considering the operation may kill a lot of innocent
people. Also, if the operation results in high casualty rates respondents would view the military
action as unnecessary, seeking an alternative military operation with fewer casualties. Support
for this hypothesis would prove the nuclear taboo is supported because the respondents are more
likely to give a definitive answer if high casualties are going to result from the military proposal.
Hypothesis 7: Scenarios with high casualties, will make respondents less likely to select need
more information for the planned military action.
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The independent variable nuclear airstrikes will cause respondents to use logic of
appropriateness to select their answer because, nuclear weapons are an unusable weapon.
Additionally, using nuclear weapons would increase the risk of damaging the U. S’s reputation
and would violate a lot of American values. This would cause more respondents to not select
need more information because the stakes are so high that they would rather say yes or no to the
planned military operation. Support for this hypothesis would confirm that the nuclear taboo is
supported because respondents are more likely to give a definitive answer if nuclear weapons are
being used in the military proposal.
Hypothesis 8: Scenarios with nuclear airstrikes, will make respondents less likely to select need
more information for the planned military action.
The independent variable genocide will cause respondents to use logic of appropriateness
to reach their answer because genocide is seen as repulsive action that is condemned by the
international community. Genocide is seen as an international violation and is seen by all states
as an immoral practice. Using genocide would cause respondents to not select need more
information because they see the need to prevent genocide from occurring. Respondents would
see the result of doing nothing as immoral, and too risky to ignore. Support for this hypothesis
would falsify the nuclear taboo because the respondents are more likely to give a definitive
answer if genocide is occurring and would be willing to support the military proposal to prevent
it further by any means necessary.
Hypothesis 9: Scenarios with genocide, will make respondents less likely to select need more
information for the planned military action.
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METHODOLOGY
There are several important defects in Press, Sagan, and Valentino’s experimental study
of attitudes about nuclear weapons. The first problem is the prospective target in the experiment
is Al Qaeda. Most American’s view Al Qaeda as evil; this bias makes it acceptable to use nuclear
weapons against America’s greatest threat. Al Qaeda is not just an enemy of the United States;
this group carried out the largest terrorist attack in American history on U.S soil. This event
would limit the perception of the taboo due to the magnitude of the event and would have a
priming effect on the respondents. According to Schacter, Stevens, and Wig (2008), “Priming is
typically defined as a nonconscious or implicit form of memory” (624). Many would think a
justifiable response would be for the United States to use nuclear weapons against Al Qaeda to
prevent another major attack from happening again. Press, Sagan, and Valentino admit
respondents could have selected to use nuclear weapons because the target was planning to kill
many American civilians and went with the more effective option. To them, it was the most
moral alternative. (2013, 201).
Additionally, Press, Sagan, and Valentino describes policy choices that are determined by
strategic interactions as results of logic of consequence, because states choose to avoid certain
tactics that could set a precedent and harm their mutual long-term benefit. (2013, 189). However,
by assuming that respondents who selected the option of setting a precedent for explaining why
they did not favor using nuclear weapons, did so because of negative long-term costs. This
assumption ignores the possibility that a respondent could have chosen not to use nuclear
weapons because they did not want to break or change the rules about nuclear weapons use.
Causing the respondents to choose to set precedent as their response to why they did not approve
14

of using nuclear weapons. In this case, the respondents would be using logic of appropriateness
not logic of consequence in answering the question about why they did not support using nuclear
weapons.
Furthermore, Press, Sagan, and Valentino, define logic of appropriateness as
preconceived ideas about types of behavior in terms of ethical and social prohibitions. (2013,
189). In their experiment logic of appropriateness is closely associated with moral and ethical
responses. However, Schultz (2014) states that “logic of appropriateness does not primarily refer
to moral or aesthetical appropriateness; rather, the key feature of logic of appropriateness is a
matching of rules to situations.” (3). This explains why most of the respondent who chose not to
use nuclear weapons selected setting a precedent as their reason because using nuclear weapons
would have gone against the rules of the situation. Focusing too closely on moral and ethical
concerns, Press, Sagan, and Valentino, misinterpret what actions apply to logic of
appropriateness.
Also, Press, Sagan Valentino stated that, the decision to use nuclear weapons could set a
precedent causing other states to build or use them (2013, 191). This variable is labeled as “set
precedent”, on their list of reasons for preferring a conventional strike. Since Al Qaeda is not a
recognized member of the international community, states would not view the use of nuclear
weapons as a violation of norms. Norms can only be broken if it they are considered to be a part
of a group’s identity. Another reason why the nuclear taboo would be void, because Al Qaeda is
not seen as civilized group, this perception would allow for the United States to be seen justified
in using nuclear weapons without changing the precedent of non-use. Tannenwald stated that the
non-use of nuclear weapons is an agreement among the civilized societies, considered to be state
15

actors (1999, 437). Al Qaeda does not fit into this group; therefore, using nuclear weapons
against a non-state actor would not have the same effect as using nuclear weapons against
another civilized state actor.
Another defect in the experiment is that all the information is provided to the participants
inadvertently priming respondents to conduct cost benefit analysis, rather than them choosing the
logic of consequence approach. Domke, Shah, and Wackman (1998) stated, “Priming effects-the
process by which activated mental constructs can influence how individuals evaluate other
concepts and ideas” (51). Information that participants are given include mission success rates,
estimated casualty rates, and description of hypothetical terrorist attack if the mission fails.
Providing all this information reduces the presence of logic of the appropriateness in the
experiment, priming the respondents so that they will give a certain answer to a question.
According to Schacter and Tulving (1990), “priming is a type of implicit memory; it
does not involve explicit or conscious recollection of any previous experiences.” (pg. 301). By
using certain words in their scenario such as casualty rates, success, and terrorist to describe
what is going, respondents are giving answers that are based in logic of consequence. Dehaene et
al. (1998) argued, priming causes cognition process to start without having access to
consciousness (597). The respondents are not doing this knowingly and are not consciously
coming to their own conclusion in Press, Sagan, and Valentino’s research experiment.
Lastly, for respondents who choose to use nuclear weapons in their scenario, there is no
way to measure if this response is a result of logic of appropriateness. Press, Sagan, and
Valentino assume that if the respondents are choosing nuclear weapons, they are cost benefit
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analyzing, even though respondents could be making this decision under the influence of another
norm. If a respondent chooses to use nuclear weapons because Al Qaeda is a terrorist group and
terrorism is seen by civilized societies as morally wrong, then the response to use nuclear
weapons is based off the logic of appropriateness argument because terrorism is seen by civilized
society as prohibited behavior. If the public does perceive terrorists’ organizations as a danger to
society, then nuclear weapons would become acceptable to use to defeat terrorism. The United
States has declared war on terrorism in the past. This declaration in the eyes of the American
public must be won. The negative feelings of Americans toward terrorists’ organizations would
come from the social norms established by the international community, and the decision to use
nuclear weapons would stem from logic of appropriateness.
These defects can be overcome using an alternate experimental design. In this alternate
scenario, participants will be presented with a military conflict and will have to decide whether
they approve, disapprove, need more information, or neither approve nor disapprove of a
potential United States military action. The three experimentally manipulated independent
variables are, the type of airstrike that is carried out, the casualties caused by the airstrike, and a
social norm. The scenario has eight different versions, to account for the three variables in the
experiment. Each version will have a military action conducted by the United States, either a
conventional airstrike or a nuclear airstrike. Each version will have casualties ranging either from
5,000 to 50,000. Additionally, the state the United States has launched a military strike against a
state that have conducted genocide or have not. This gives us all the possible versions of the
scenario in the experiment, to determine if there is in any difference in respondent’s answers to
the different versions. See scenarios below.
17

Version 1
Imagine that a state has attacked an American ally. The purpose of the attack is to overthrow the ally’s government.
To stop the attack before the allied government is overthrown, the United States government is going to launch a
[conventional airstrike] against the attacking state’s military forces. The conventional airstrike is [estimated to kill
50,000 people.]
Version 2
Imagine that a state has attacked an American ally. The purpose of the attack is to overthrow the ally’s government.
To stop the attack before the allied government is overthrown, the United States government is going to launch a
[nuclear airstrike] against the attacking state’s military forces. The nuclear strike is [estimated to kill 5,000 people.]
Version 3
Imagine that a state has attacked an American ally. The purpose of the attack is to overthrow the ally’s government.
The attacking state has also [engaged in genocidal attacks] against civilians in the allied state. To stop the attack
before the allied government is overthrown [and to stop the attacking state from continuing genocide,] the United
States is going to launch a [conventional airstrike] against the attacking state’s military forces. The conventional
airstrike is [estimated to kill 50,000 people.]
Version 4
Imagine that a state has attacked an American ally. The purpose of the attack is to overthrow the ally’s government.
The attacking state has also [engaged in genocidal attacks] against civilians in the allied state. To stop the attack
before the allied government is overthrown [and to stop the attacking state from continuing genocide,] the United
States is going to launch a [nuclear strike] against the state’s military forces. The nuclear strike is [estimated to kill
5,000 people.]
Version 5
Imagine that a state has attacked an American ally. The purpose of the attack is to overthrow the ally’s government.
To stop the attack before the allied government is overthrown, the United States government is going to launch a
[nuclear airstrike] against the attacking state’s military forces. The nuclear strike is [estimated to kill 50,000 people.]
Version 6
Imagine that a state has attacked an American ally. The purpose of the attack is to overthrow the ally’s government.
To stop the attack before the allied government is overthrown, the United States government is going to launch a
[conventional airstrike] against the attacking state’s military forces. The conventional airstrike is [estimated to kill
5,000 people.]
Version 7
Imagine that a state has attacked an American ally. The purpose of the attack is to overthrow the ally’s government.
The attacking state has also [engaged in genocidal attacks] against civilians in the allied state. To stop the attack
before the allied government is overthrown [and to stop the attacking state from continuing genocide,] the United
States government is going to launch a [conventional airstrike] against the attacking state’s military forces. The
conventional airstrike is [estimated to kill 5,000 people.]
Version 8
Imagine that a state has attacked an American ally. The purpose of the attack is to overthrow the ally’s government.
The attacking state has also [engaged in genocidal attacks] against civilians in the allied state. To stop the attack
before the allied government is overthrown [and to stop the attacking state from continuing genocide,] the United
States government is going to launch a [nuclear strike] against the state’s military forces. The nuclear strike is
[estimated to kill 50,000 people.]

18

After participants have read the scenario they will be given two questions. The first
question asks respondents, how much did the following considerations influence their answers?
Reponses range from a great deal, a lot, a moderate amount, a little, not at all, and not relevant.
By providing respondents with a range we can assess whether logic of consequence or logic of
appropriateness is stronger or weaker in an individual’s decision. Then respondents will be
presented with a second question and given a list of ten considerations and asked which
considerations made them more supportive or less supportive of the planned military action?
This will provide a clear idea of what specific information influenced respondents to be more or
less supportive of the planned military action. Certain considerations will be coded as logic of
consequence and others will be coded as taboo responses for both questions. In doing so we can
accurately determine if people are influenced more by logic of consequence or the nuclear taboo.
After answering the scenario, respondents will give a list of questions and will be asked
whether they strongly agree, agree, somewhat agree, neither disagree nor agree, somewhat
disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree. Certain questions will be asked to measure different
moral values such as harm and care, purity and sanctity, and in-group loyalty, helping identify
which values are more closely associated with the nuclear taboo. Also, the survey asks
respondents questions regarding patriotism and nationalism to measure how strong these
attitudes about one’s identity affect the decision to break a norm. Showing just how strong the
nuclear taboo is when compared to other important identity behaviors.
This alternate design addresses the main problems in Press, Sagan, and Valentino’s
experiment. The first major defect in Press, Sagan, and Valentino’s experimental design is their
choice to use Al Qaeda as the prospective target. In the alternate experiment design, Al Qaeda is
19

no longer the main target of U.S military action, instead it is a state’s military forces. The reason
the state is not given a specific name, is to remove the American public’s bias about the intended
target of the U.S military. In the alternate design genocide is put in place of Al Qaeda, this
establishes the state actor in the scenario as evil, without providing the state’s name and provides
the actor with an identity that does not completely remove in-group bias. By not giving the
perspective target a name, the experiment avoids acquiring responses that are based off historical
events in the past. Forcing the respondents to not evaluate the situation based on who is involved,
but rather the type of action that is being taken. By not providing the name of the specific target,
we are limiting the amount of in-group bias in the experiment.
The second problem in their experiment, is that one of the categories that respondents
could choose from for preferring a conventional strike over a nuclear strike was, that it would set
a precedent that would make nuclear weapons usable. The problem with this category is that Al
Qaeda is not a state, other states would not view the use of nuclear weapons as a violation of
norms, due to its lack of recognition in the international community. In the alternate experiment,
making the perspective target a state. Allows for the respondents to correctly apply the category
of “setting a precedent”. The international community would not view the use of nuclear
weapons against Al Qaeda, as it would if the target was a state. Making the perspective target a
state, gives this category a more accurate response, due to the target being a member of the
international community. The nuclear taboo is seen as a rule about the use of nuclear weapons
among civilized societies, if the target does not fit into that category, then the rules about nuclear
weapons do not apply to it. Thus, setting a precedent would not count as a reason, why
respondents would choose conventional strike, over nuclear strike.
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Additionally, instead of asking respondents why they choose not to use nuclear weapons,
the alternate experiment asks which considerations in the given scenario made them more
supportive or less supportive of the U.S military plan. This gives the respondents multiple
reasons for why they choose to support or not support U.S military action. Making it possible for
respondents to conduct both logic of consequence and logic of appropriateness. Also, it limits the
morality emphasis that Press, Sagan, and Valentino associated with the logic of appropriateness
because we are not asking respondents why they choose their answer. Instead, we are asking
respondents what information given influenced them the most in making their decision.
Another defect in their experiment that was listed was that they provided all the
information to the respondents, inadvertently priming respondents to conduct cost benefit
analysis, rather than them choosing the logic of consequence approach. In the alternate
experiment, all the information is not provided to the respondents, instead they must look for the
information. By requiring respondents to conduct cost benefit analysis on their own, the
experiment is giving the respondents the opportunity to choose how they come up with their
answer to the scenario. By avoiding unnecessary information in the scenario, minimizes the
possibility for priming to occur. Instead of telling respondents what the consequences will be,
respondents will have to decide what the consequences could be. Thus, avoiding information that
would trigger a specific response, rather than the responses being genuine and coming directly
from their own thought process.
Lastly, the experiment, does not considered the presence of another social norm. Press,
Sagan, and Valentino assume that if respondents choose to use nuclear weapons, then the
respondents are using logic of consequence. By using a terrorist group such as Al Qaeda as the
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target, the respondents could be basing their decision to use nuclear weapons because of
terrorism is being an immoral act. In the alternate experiment, the issue is addressed by
accounting for another social norm as a reason why nuclear weapons would be appropriate to
use. According to Dolan, deciding to violate a taboo to preserve other values will seem tragic
rather than taboo (2013, 38). The alternate experiment uses genocide as the other social norm
present in the experiment because genocide is condemned broadly among the international
community as an immoral act. This should provide us with the same type of reasoning that was
not accounted for in Press, Sagan, and Valentino’s experiment, as to why its respondents would
approve the use of nuclear weapons to defend other social norms that are more vital to the
interest of civilized society than the nuclear taboo.
In this experiment the participants consisted of mostly college students, however, a small
number of the respondents were quite older. The average age of the respondents was twentyeight years old of the 104 respondents who participated in the survey. The survey was created
using Qualtrics and was disseminated through email to students providing them with information
about the survey and the survey link to take it. The number of respondents who participated that
were male was forty-nine and the number of respondents who were female that participated was
fifty-five. When it came to income most respondents made $50,000 or less with a total of thirtyseven respondents falling in this category, and twenty-nine respondents made more than
$50,000, but less than $100,000. With twenty-four respondents making more than $100,000 a
year. Here are the results from the survey data collected.
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RESULTS
Table 1: Respondents Who Selected Agreed or Disagreed

Indep. Variables

Nuclear
High Casualty
Genocide

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Agree

Agree

Disagree

Disagree

-1.168**
(.435)
-.481
(.429)
1.141**
(.434)

-2.666***
(.735)
-.979†
(.586)
.937†
(.560)
.459
(.305)

2.271***
(.534)
1.088*
(.501)
-.939†
(.499)

3.662***
(.946)
1.983*
(.819)
-.422
(.636)
-.784*
(.359)

SizeHousehold
Income

.059
(.188)
.951**
(.276)
-.131
(.552)
-.014
(.020)
.649
(.566)
-2.830
(1.279)

Ideology
Him
Age
NukesLSupt
Constant
# of resp. 1
# of resp. 2

45

.226
(.229)
-1.208***
(.346)
.353
(.639)
-.019
(.029)
-.518
(.668)
1.565
(1.417)
34

88

88

Key: †= p < .1, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001, P= (sig)
Casualties: Low or High
Analyzing the findings using logistic regression for binary dependent variables, I have
found the results for Hypothesis 1 to be mixed. The number of respondents who agreed to the
military operation was 45, and the number of respondents who selected disagree was 34. The
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first hypothesis expects that high casualties will increase disagreement with the proposed
military action and decrease agreement with the proposed military action. While the high
casualties co-efficient for agree was negative (-.481) and in the expected direction, it did not
meet thresholds of statistical significance (p= .263). In contrast, the high casualty co-efficient for
disagree is in the expected direction (1.088), and it is significant at the p= .05 level (p = .03).
Hypothesis 7 expects that high casualties will decrease the need for more information with the
proposed military action. The number of respondents that selected need more information was
25. The evidence for hypothesis 7 is mixed. While the high casualty co-efficient for need more
information was negative (-.453) going in the expected direction, it did not meet thresholds for
statistical significance (p= .343).
Analyzing the findings using the logistic regression for binary dependent variable, I have
found that Hypothesis 2 is mixed. The second hypothesis expects that low casualty rates will
increase agreement with the proposed military action and decrease disagreement with the
proposed military action. While the effect of high casualty co-efficient for agree was negative (.481), this shows that for low casualties the result is in the expected direction and is not
statistically significant (p= .263). This shows that the effect of low casualties is also not
statistically significant and has minimal effect on the respondent’s decision-making process. The
co-efficient value being close to zero, tells that similar effects would result if lower casualties
were present in the scenario. Additionally, the high casualty co-efficient for disagree is in the
expected direction (1.088), and it is statistically significant at the p= .05 level (p = .03). This
shows that low casualties would have a stronger effect on the respondents who disagreed to do
the distance the co-efficient is from the score of zero.
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Airstrike: Nuclear or Conventional
Analyzing the findings using the logistic regression for binary dependent variables, I
have found the results for Hypothesis 3 to be correct. The third hypothesis expects that
conventional airstrikes will increase agreement with the proposed military action and decrease
disagreement with the proposed military action. While the nuclear co-efficient for agree was
negative (-1.168) in the expected direction, this shows that conventional airstrike would have the
opposite effect making the respondents more likely to agree with the proposed military action.
The nuclear co-efficient for disagree was positive (2.271) and in the expected direction. This coefficient value far enough away from zero that the use of conventional airstrikes would have the
opposite effect on respondents.
Analyzing the findings using the logistic regression for binary dependent variable, I
have found the results for Hypothesis 4 to be correct. The fourth hypothesis expects that nuclear
airstrike will increase disagreement with the military proposal and decrease agreement with the
military proposal. With the nuclear co-efficient for agree being negative (-1.168) in the expected
direction, it also meet the thresholds for statistical significance (p= .007). Additionally, the
nuclear co-efficient for disagree is (2.271) in the expected direction and it is statistically
significant at the p= .05 level (p= .000). However, nuclear has a stronger impact on the
respondents who disagree, compared to respondents who agreed with the planned military action.
Hypothesis 8 expects that nuclear airstrike will decrease need for more information with the
proposed military action. The results for this hypothesis are mixed. While the nuclear coefficient for need more information was negative (-.901) going in the expected direction, it did
not meet thresholds for statistical significance (p= .066).
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Genocide or Not
Analyzing the findings using the logistic regression for binary dependent variable, I have
found the results for Hypothesis 5 to be mixed. The fifth hypothesis expects that genocide will
decrease disagreement with the proposal and increase agreement with the proposal. With the
genocide coefficient for agree being positive (1.141) in the expected direction and is also
statistically significant at the p=.05 level (p=.008). In contrast, the genocide co-efficient for
disagree is negative (-.939) and is in the expected direction, however, it did not meet the
thresholds for statistical significance (p= .060). The ninth hypothesis expects that genocide will
decrease need more information with the proposed military action. The evidence for this
hypothesis is mixed. While the co-efficient for need more information was negative (-.556) in the
expected direction it did not meet the thresholds for statistical significance (p= .244). The
strongest effect for this hypothesis is the category of respondents who selected agree with the
military proposal.
Analyzing the findings using the logistic regression for binary dependent variable, I have
found the results for Hypothesis 6 to be mixed. The sixth hypothesis expects that when genocide
is not in the scenario it will decrease agreement with the military proposal and will increase
disagreement with the military proposal. With the genocide co-efficient for agree being positive
(1.141), in the expected direction, when genocide is absent the effect will be negative for those
who agree with the proposal. With the genocide co-efficient for disagree being negative (-.939)
and in the expected direction, when genocide is absent it will increase disagreement for the
proposed military operation. The charts below represent the number of times each variable was
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present in the scenario for respondents who selected agree, disagree, and need more information
as there answer.
Figure 1: Respondents Who Selected Agree with Variables Present
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Figure 2: Respondents Who Selected Disagree with Variables Present
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Figure 3: Respondents Who Selected Need More Information with Variables Present
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Control Variables
Additionally, the results include a few other independent variable effects such as age,
gender, income, and political ideology. Analyzing the results shows that there is only one
statistically significant variable the influences the respondents and this is political ideology.
Looking at the variables in the equation table for respondents who agreed with the planned
military action, shows that the relationship is positive. Conservatives were more likely to agree
with the proposed military action. The co-efficient value for political ideology is .951 and shows
that there is a political ideology effect on the respondent’s decision to the planned military
action. The p-value for political ideology is (.001), which is statistically significant. These
findings show that when respondents agreed to the planned military action, there is a political
ideological influence when making their decision.
The results for respondents who selected disagree, when it came to political ideology had
a negative effect. Conservatives were less likely to disagree with the proposed military action.
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Analyzing the coefficient value for political ideology (which is -1.208), indicates that when
respondents select to disagree, their political ideology has a major effect on the outcome. The pvalue for political ideology is (.000), which is statistically significant. These findings show that
when respondents disagreed with the planned military action, there was political ideological
difference that influenced the respondents. Looking at the respondents who disagreed with the
planned military action, there responses are more effected by political ideology than the
respondents who agreed to the planned military action. Showing that when respondents came to
disagree with the planned military action, their political ideology had a stronger influence over
their decision as compared to the respondents who agreed to the planned military action. This
effect can be seen by comparing the two p-values of each respondent group. Furthermore, the b
value shows that the negative effect for respondents who disagreed with the planned military
action, is larger than the respondents who agreed to the planned military action.
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DISCUSSION
For respondents who selected agree as their answer to the planned military action,
showed that the nuclear variable had the strongest effect and the most statistically significant
effect. With a coefficient value of (-1.168) and a p-value of (.007) nuclear had the strongest
effect on the respondents who chose to agree with the proposal. This indicates that nuclear
weapons made respondents more likely to disagree with the military proposal, than any of the
other two variables. The second strongest variable for respondents who selected agree as their
answer was genocide, with a coefficient value of (1.141) and a p value of (.008). These results
show that when genocide is present in the scenario it increases the respondent’s tendencies to
agree with the planned military action, however, it is not as strong as the nuclear variable. The
weakest variable for respondents who agreed to the planned military action was high casualties,
the coefficient value of (-.481) and a p-value of (.263). These findings reveal that for respondents
who agreed with the planned military action were influenced mostly by the nuclear variable and
prove that the nuclear taboo had the strongest effect on respondents.
Looking at respondents who selected disagree as their answer to the planned military
action. Indicated that the nuclear variable had the strongest and was the most statistically
significant effect on the respondents. With a coefficient value of (2.271) and a p-value of (.000),
nuclear had the strongest effect on the respondents who chose to disagree as their answer. The
nuclear variable has the strongest effect on respondents who select disagree with the military
proposal than any other variable. This proves the hypotheses and supports the effect of a nuclear
taboo for respondents who selected disagree.
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The second strongest variable for respondents who selected disagree as their answer was
high casualties, with a coefficient value of (1.088) and a p-value of (.030). This shows that
respondents are also not likely to support military action if the scenario has high casualty
outcomes and proves that the nuclear taboo is not the only reason respondents are disagreeing
with the planned military action. The weakest variable for respondents who disagreed with the
planned military action was genocide, with a coefficient value of (-.939) and p-value of (.060).
These results show that respondents who disagreed with the planned military action were more
likely to do so because of the presence of nuclear weapons, followed by high casualties, and then
genocide. These findings are consistent with the hypotheses and show that the nuclear taboo has
the strongest effect when it comes to why respondents disagreed with the proposed military
action.
Examining the respondents who selected need more information as their answer to the
planned military action, conveyed that the nuclear variable had the strongest effect on the
respondents. With a coefficient value of (-.901) and a p-value of (.066), nuclear had the strongest
effect on respondents who selected need more information. This conveys that when nuclear
weapons are present it increases the possibility that respondents will select disagree or agree with
the proposed military action. The presence of nuclear weapons puts more skin in the game and
increases the risk that respondents would have to be willing to consider, when selecting need
more information.
The second strongest variable for this respondent group was genocide, with a coefficient
value of (-.556) and a p-value of (.244). The variable with the weakest effect was high casualties,
with a coefficient value of (-.453) and p value of (.343). Although, respondents are less willing to
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select need more information when genocide or high casualties are present the strength of that
relationship is relatively weaker than the nuclear variable. Respondents don’t associate the same
amount or risk for genocide and high casualties that they do for nuclear weapons. These results
support the presence of a nuclear taboo for respondents who select need more information,
however, the effect is weaker for this respondent group than the other two groups.
This thesis used a more appropriate experimental framework to test whether the nuclear
taboo shapes the perception of nuclear weapons among the public. Challenging Press, Sagan, and
Valentino’s (2013) research that people are more likely to use logic of consequence rather than
logic of appropriateness when assessing the use of nuclear weapons. There is evidence in this
experiment that proves that logic of consequence is present when respondents are considering the
use of nuclear weapons. The results for respondents who selected disagree for the proposed
military action, show that high casualty rates had a significant effect on the respondent’s
decision. However, the findings of this research indicate that the logic of appropriateness has a
stronger influence on respondent’s decision compared to logic of consequence.
Most of the findings indicate that nuclear weapons seem to be the deciding factor for
many of the respondents in the survey. The nuclear variable has some statistically significant
effect for most of the respondent groups. While high casualty has some effect on the
respondents, higher casualties have lower statistically significance and smaller coefficient values
compared to the nuclear variable. Additionally, the third effect of genocide is present and
respondents who do agree with the planned military action do so because of the presence of
genocide. However, genocide has the lowest p-value of the three independent variables
introduced in the research. It also has the smaller coefficient values than the other two variables
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in the research and shows that genocide has minimal effect on the respondents. Overall, the
variable with the strongest effect in the experiment is nuclear followed by high casualties, and
then genocide. This research helps show that when respondents are deciding to agree or disagree
with the planned military action when nuclear weapons are being used, respondents will disagree
with the planned military action, revealing the presence of a nuclear taboo.
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CONCLUSION
There have been many theories that have tried to explain the practice of non-use when it
comes to nuclear weapons, such as the nuclear taboo. The purpose of this thesis is to determine if
social norms shape public attitudes regarding the use of nuclear weapons based on Nuclear
Taboo Theory. By assessing if the public uses logic of appropriateness to make their decision
about the use of nuclear weapons, or if they use logic of consequence when making their
decision. This thesis has found that logic of appropriateness is responsible for the decision
making of many of the respondents. These findings indicate that the variable with the most
statistically significant effect of the three independent variables introduced was the type of
airstrike used.
The other two variables in the research high casualties and genocide had relatively minor
effects on the respondent’s decision to agree or disagree with the planned military action. When
looking at genocide, the effect is minimal on the respondent’s decision-making process, while
high casualties has a stronger effect on the respondent’s answer. These research findings
conclude that the nuclear taboo is present and that in the public’s view, the use of nuclear
weapons is unconventional and that they are unlike other weapons. That when it comes to
nuclear weapons, the public does not support their use even if using them could beneficial. These
findings help establish that a nuclear taboo is present and that the type of weapons being used
has a greater effect than high casualties and the use of genocide.
This project has several limitations. One limitation is that the sample of respondents is
relatively small for the number of variables present in the experiment. With only 104 total
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responses for eight different outcomes, there is a limited amount of data present for each
scenario. Second, most of the respondents are college students, and around the same age. This
may have caused the experiment to only capture what one generation thinks about nuclear
weapons, rather than the overall public. The third limitation of the experiment is that most of the
respondents were U.S citizens and does not provide a representation of what other country
citizens may think about the use of nuclear weapons. Lastly, although respondents are affected
more by the presence of nuclear weapons, this does not mean that the nuclear taboo is the only
reason for why they choose not to support the planned military action. Their maybe other factors
about nuclear weapons that could be affecting the results of respondents about nuclear weapons.
To develop this research further, one could increase the number of independent variables
present in the experiment. Considering that two of the three variables in the scenario are taboo
related and only one is a logic of consequence, there might be other cost benefit variables that
have a stronger impact on respondents, such as operational expenses or cost of damages. This
could weaken the effect of nuclear or genocide variables on the respondents showing that cost
benefit analysis is more effective in the decision-making process. Additionally, more research is
needed to understand what unconscious psychological elements are in affect when respondents
are making their decision. A possible experiment that could test this would be using priming to
assess whether respondents have strong responses to certain words, such as nuclear or genocide
compared to other words like casualties. This would help measure which variables that trigger
the unconscious response of respondents more and would provide evidence of which type of
variable is stronger. Overall, the results of this experiment indicate that nuclear weapons have
more influence over respondents, when they go about assessing the scenario.
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